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WHAT DETERMINES WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN
COLLECTIVE ACTION? EVIDENCE FROM A WESTERN
UGANDAN COFFEE COOPERATIVE
Felix Meier zu Selhausen
ABSTRACT
Women smallholders face greater constraints than men in accessing capital and
commodity markets in Sub-Saharan Africa. Collective action has been promoted
to remedy those disadvantages. Using survey data of 421 women members and
210 nonmembers of a coffee producer cooperative in Western Uganda, this
study investigates the determinants of women’s participation in cooperatives
and women’s intensity of participation. The results highlight the importance
of access to and control over land for women to join the cooperative in the
first place. Participation intensity is measured through women’s participation
in collective coffee marketing and share capital contributions. It is found
that duration of membership, access to extension services, more equal
intrahousehold power relations, and joint land ownership positively influence
women’s ability to commit to collective action. These findings demonstrate the
embeddedness of collective action in gender relations and the positive value of
women’s active participation for agricultural-marketing cooperatives.
KEYWORDS
Women’s agency, household bargaining power, collective action, cooperative,
smallholder farmers, Uganda
JEL Codes: J16, Q13
INTRODUCTION
In many parts of the developing world women’s greater representation
among the poor mirrors the fact that women face persistent constraints
that limit their further inclusion in agriculture and entrepreneurship (Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Julia Behrman, Patricia Biermayr-
Jenzano, Vicki Wilde, Marco Noordeloos, Catherine Ragasa, and Nienke
Beintema 2011; World Bank 2011; Esther Duflo 2012). In Sub-Saharan
Africa in particular, women face greater barriers than men in accessing
agricultural markets to sell their produce (at reasonable prices) and to
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access capital to raise their productivity and farm incomes (Janice Jiggins
1989; World Bank 2011; Amber Peterman, Agnes R. Quisumbing, and
Julia A. Behrman 2014). Women are particularly vulnerable to exploitative
trading practices and have weak bargaining positions with predominantly
male networks in the value-chain (Paineto Baluku, Linda Mayoux, and
Thies Reemer 2009; Elaine Jones, Sally Smith, and Carol Wills 2012),
which limits women’s agricultural productivity (Markus Goldstein and
Christopher Udry 2008; Amber Peterman, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Julia A.
Behrman, and Ephraim Nkonya 2011) and constrains their ability to move
from subsistence agriculture to more profitable higher value chains (World
Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations [FAO]
2009).
Against this background, participation in collective action through
cooperatives has been promoted as one promising strategy for women
smallholders to overcome market imperfections and increase productivity
and farm incomes (Johnston Birchall 2003; Lauren Pandolfelli, Ruth
Meinzen-Dick, and Stephan Dohrn 2008; Helen Markelova, Ruth Meinzen-
Dick, Jon Hellin, and Stephan Dohrn 2009; Agnes R. Quisumbing and
Lauren Pandolfelli 2010; Punita B. Datta and Robert Gailey 2012; Eva
Majurin 2012). Agricultural marketing cooperatives pool smallholder
farmers’ produce and link them to international and domestic markets.
Collective marketing realizes economies of scale and enhances farmers’
power to negotiate better prices and tap into high-value markets, otherwise
unreachable through intermediary buyers (Meike Wollni and Manfred
Zeller 2007; Helen Markelova and Esther Mwangi 2010; Bekele Shiferaw,
Jon Hellin, and Geoffrey Muricho 2011; Nigel D. Poole, Maureen
Chitundu, and Ronald Msoni 2013). Furthermore, cooperatives can raise
members’ productivity and social inclusion through the provision of
additional services (James Barham and Clarence Chitemi 2009; Majurin
2012), such as access to credit and thrift, technical assistance, and
agricultural inputs.
Understanding what drives women’s participation in collective action
is important for cooperatives’ survival and growth in the long run, as
the organization crucially depends on members’ produce to generate
economies of scale in processing and marketing (Chris Bruynis, Peter
D. Goldsmith, David E. Hahn, and William J. Taylor 2001; Johnston
Birchall and Richard Simmons 2004). However, nominal participation
alone does not explain how intensively women smallholders participate
and commit themselves to their organization. Often producer groups are
not successful because expected benefits do not materialize, resulting
in members’ passive participation or exiting, and groups dissolving
(Markelova, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, and Dohrn 2009; Shiferaw, Hellin,
and Muricho 2011). Another factor that can undermine the success of
agricultural marketing cooperatives is if members do not sell their entire
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
produce to their cooperative but instead engage in side selling to local
traders due to temporal cash constraints, price variations, as well as
unequal intrahousehold gender relations (Baluku, Mayoux, and Reemer
2009). Moreover, cooperatives rely on members’ voluntary share-capital
contributions as a primary source of capital to develop its cooperative
business (J. D. Von Pischke and John G. Rouse 2004; Chiara Cazuffi and
Alexander Moradi 2012). Therefore, cooperatives would benefit from a
better understanding of how to improve women’s degree of participation.
Various recent studies have explored African smallholders’ determinants
of membership in cooperatives (Tanguy Bernard and David J. Spielman
2009; Elisabeth Fischer and Matin Qaim 2012) as well as their intensity
of participation (Joan R. Fulton and Wiktor L. Adamowicz 1993; Edouard
R. Mensah, Kostas Karantininis, Anselme Adégbidi, and Julius J. Okello
2012; Gaudiose Mujawamariya, Marijke D’Haese, and Stijn Speelman 2013;
Elisabeth Fischer and Matin Qaim 2014; Meike Wollni and Elisabeth
Fischer 2015). However, although gender is held as a key determinant of
people’s ability to participate in collective action, a deeper understanding
of the determinants of women’s participation in and within cooperatives
is still missing. In particular, whereas previous works have emphasized
the institutional conditions, hitherto little attention has been paid to
intrahousehold power dynamics as drivers of women’s participation in
collective action.
This contribution aims to fill this research gap utilizing a dataset
of women smallholders from rural Uganda, comprising 421 members
of a coffee-marketing cooperative as well as 210 randomly selected
nonmembers from the same treatment area. The two main goals of the
study are to better understand what factors influence women’s membership
in cooperatives and their intensity of participation within cooperatives.
Women members’ degree of participation within the cooperative is
measured through collective marketing of coffee through the cooperative
versus side selling, and members’ share-capital contributions.
WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
What influences women’s participation in cooperatives?
Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework comprising factors that
have been hypothesized to influence women farmers’ membership and
participation intensity in cooperatives. While marginal costs and benefits
and group characteristics have been previously emphasized in the literature
on collective action (Elinor Ostrom 2000; Birchall and Simmons 2004;
Markelova et al. 2009), socioeconomic characteristics and intrahousehold
power relations play an equally important role in women’s participation
within the context of patriarchy and poverty. In her oft-cited article,
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Figure 1 Factors influencing women’s participation in cooperatives
Naila Kabeer (1999) highlights women’s ability to exercise strategic life
choices within three measurable and interrelated dimensions: resources,
agency, and achievements. Participation in collective action clearly presents
a (strategic) life choice. This analysis of women’s participation in
cooperatives focuses on women’s access to resources and agency in
particular.
Access to resources
African women’s unequal access to productive resources often limits their
opportunities to participate in collective action, leading to male-dominated
cooperatives (Ruth Meinzen-Dick and Margreet Zwarteveen 1998; Chris
Penrose-Buckley 2007; Degnet Abebaw and Megbib G. Haile 2013). One
important aspect of smallholder farmers’ membership in cooperatives is
land ownership. Because land traditionally belongs to men, women are
often not eligible to join cooperatives in cases where land ownership is
a condition for joining. Even where women own land, tenure insecurity
lowers women’s agricultural productivity in the medium run (Goldstein
and Udry 2008).
Women’s ability to own productive resources within the household
are likely to strengthen their bargaining position, given that access
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
to productive resources within the household is typically considered a
function of women’s bargaining power (Bina Agarwal 1997). Numerous
studies find land size positively correlated with women smallholders’
decisions to join agricultural-marketing cooperatives in Ethiopia (Bernard
and Spielman 2009), Kenya (Fischer and Qaim 2012), and Costa Rica
(Wollni and Zeller 2007), while land-security perceptions are lower
among coffee-cooperative members in Rwanda (Mujawamriya, D’Haese,
and Speelman 2013) and not significantly different between women
members and nonmembers in Chad (Katinka Weinberger and Johannes
P. Jütting 2001). Furthermore, women with more productive resources and
entrepreneurial experience in crop cultivation may expect greater benefits
from participation in cooperatives.
Beyond land, women’s access to education may also affect their
participation in collective action. On the one hand, the attainment of
literacy skills may predetermine women’s ability to work outside the
agricultural sector in wage-labor markets, and thus the necessity of joining
agricultural cooperatives. On the other hand, skilled smallholders may be
able to process the benefits and costs regarding cooperative membership
more effectively, possess a greater long-term horizon, and have a better
relative social position within the household. Bernard and Spielman (2009)
as well as Wollni and Zeller (2007) find that the level of education
and entrepreneurial experience positively influenced participation in
cooperatives in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Costa Rica respectively, whereas
Weinberger and Jütting (2001) and Fischer and Qaim (2012) find contrary
evidence for Eastern and Western Africa.
Agency
Access to resources per se does not automatically lead to social change
(Marta B. Calás, Linda Smircich, and Kristina A. Bourne 2009) but also
depends on women’s ability to take autonomous choices in life and
to control resources, commonly referred to as agency (Kabeer 1999).
In particular, culturally embedded patriarchal conditions may restrict
women’s agency, creating barriers to exploit their economic opportunities
and personal capabilities (Amartya Sen 1999). Women’s participation in
cooperatives already reflects agency in itself, mirroring women’s physical
mobility and the freedom to participate in collective action. Hence, one
needs to look for indicators that preconditioned this achievement.
One of the earliest and most important turning points in girls’ lives
is marriage. Whether the timing of marriage and the choice of husband
were freely taken by the bride or whether they were arranged is a
reasonable indicator for women’s agency early in life (Robert Jensen and
Rebecca Thornton 2003). Generally, young girls who are married off to
much older men are likely to have little say in deciding the terms of
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the union, drop out of school earlier, and start having children at an
earlier age. This lack of free choice is likely to translate into large age
and educational gaps between spouses. This may further prevent women
from gaining a better bargaining position within the household (Sarah
Carmichael 2011), thus constraining their freedom to engage in collective
action. The practice of bridewealth and polygamy may introduce additional
obstacles.
What influences women’s intensity of participation within cooperatives?
So far, most studies on smallholder farmers’ participation in cooperatives
have treated participation as a binary-choice variable – equating
membership with participation. However, within collective-action
institutions the commitment of members varies. Commitment generally
captures the extent to which members choose to maintain their
membership (Iiro Jussila, Sanjay Goel, and Heidi Tuominen 2012).
Farmers’ participation intensity has been measured in multiple ways
in the agricultural-cooperative literature. For example, Fischer and Qaim
(2014) analyze smallholders’ intensity of participation in a Kenyan banana
cooperative using frequency of participation in group meetings and
both the quantity and share of marketable bananas sold through the
cooperative. While they document that women’s intensity of participation
within banana groups is not significantly different from men, they do
not explore the factors that affected men’s and women’s participation
separately. They find that more specialized and medium-sized banana
farmers, and past beneficiaries of group services, were more likely to
participate in collective marketing and meetings. In another recent work,
Wollni and Fischer (2015) find an inverse relationship between farm size
and collective marketing among cooperative coffee farmers in Costa Rica.
Also, Mujawamariya, D’Haese, and Speelman (2013) use the proportion of
collectively marketed coffee versus side selling to traders as an indicator of
member commitment in four Rwandan coffee cooperatives. They explain
farmers’ preferences for side selling through the existence of long-standing
relationships between traders and farmers, the attractiveness of immediate
cash payment, and the additional transaction costs involved in producing
high-quality coffee. Similarly, Mensah et al. (2012) measure the share
of marketable cashew nuts delivered to a cooperative in Benin. They
find that the price offered by the cooperative compared to traders and
additional transaction costs along the value chain negatively affected
collective marketing. Lastly, Cazuffi and Moradi (2012) use members’
share capital contributions of cocoa cooperatives in Ghana as a proxy for
members’ commitment, finding that members’ capital accumulation was
positively related to wealth and negatively to membership size.
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
The studies cited above largely pay attention to marginal costs and
benefits influencing members’ level of commitment to their cooperative.
However, socioeconomic factors within the household and at the group
level are also important predictors within the context of poverty and
patriarchy, in particular when studying women’s participation (Kabeer
1999; Fischer and Qaim 2014). Although most studies cited above
control for gender, as a binary variable in regression analysis, a deeper
analysis of the gender-based determinants of women’s participation within
cooperatives is still missing.
As for nominal membership, women’s access to and control over
household resources is expected to influence women’s intensity of
participation. Within households, preferences over resource allocation are
typically not identical, and largely depend on spouses’ decision-making
power (Carmen D. Deere and Cheryl Doss 2006). In this regard, the
mutual sharing (or pooling) of income, women’s participation in various
types of household decisions, and joint ownership of land by spouses
would signal cooperation between spouses with potential gains for women’s
active participation within cooperatives. Also, household caring duties and
particularly the number of dependent children may constrain women’s
time to participate in group meetings (Meinzen-Dick and Zwarteveen
1998).
In addition, it is hypothesized that group characteristics, including the
size and gender composition of groups, influence women’s decisions
on their degree of participation. Smaller groups are typically presumed
to allow for greater interaction and social cohesion, which ensures
cooperation and avoids free riding (Mancur Olson 1965). According
to Amy R. Poteete and Elinor Ostrom (2004) no consensus exists over
the role of heterogeneity in collective action. In relation to the context
of patriarchy, it is hypothesized that women may feel more open to
speak out and participate more confidently within groups with greater
female conformity. Length of membership (in particular, being a founding
member) and the magnitude of past group benefits (credit, extension
services) also influence women’s attitudes toward participation. Physical
distance to the cooperative may influence the decision of collective
marketing, taking into account opportunity costs.
Also, husband’s comembership in his wife’s group is presumed to matter
(Helen Hambly Odame 2002), although the direction of the effect is
debated. Husbands’ comembership entails a tradeoff between reducing
household frictions (Anne M. Goetz and Rina SenGupta 1996) on the one
hand and loss of autonomy over marketing and borrowing decisions on the
other. Joint membership could enhance women’s participation, reflecting
spousal mutual sharing of preferences and trust toward the cooperative.
On the other hand, husbands might dominate group participation and
thus hamper their wives’ abilty to speak out at group meetings (Felix
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Meier zu Selhausen and Erik Stam 2013). Also, the division of labor along
the coffee value chain may affect women’s intensity of participation in
their cooperative, as it reflects their workload and control over cash-crop
production.
BACKGROUND
Coffee production and cooperatives in Uganda
In 2012, 84 percent of the Ugandan population lived in rural areas.
Agriculture is the most important sector of Uganda’s economy, employing
around 65 percent of the labor force (World Bank 2014). Coffee
accounted for almost a third of Uganda’s export earnings in 2012 (African
Development Bank [AfDB] and Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development [OECD] 2014). Next to Ethiopia, Uganda is Africa’s
top coffee exporter, producing 22 percent of African coffee in 2013
(International Coffee Organization 2014). The coffee sector in Uganda
almost entirely depends on approximately 500,000 smallholder households
– 90 percent of whose average farm sizes ranges between one and six acres
(Uganda Coffee Development Authority [UCDA] 2012).
Over the last decade the cooperative movement has been experiencing
a renaissance in both Uganda as well as in other African economies
(Patrick Develtere, Ignace Pollet and, Frederick Wanyama 2008), supplying
growing African urban markets (Elly Kaganzi, Shaun Ferris, James Barham,
Annet Abenakyo, Pascal Sanginga, and Jemimah Njuki 2009). In 2012,
there were 9,967 permanently registered cooperatives in Uganda with a
membership subscription of over 1.23 million (Ministry of Trade, Industry,
and Cooperatives [MTIC] 2012) – 47 percent being agricultural marketing
cooperatives and 28 percent savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs).
Average representation of women in cooperatives was estimated at 42
percent (Majurin 2012).
The cooperative under study
Bukonzo Joint Cooperative Microfinance Society (BJC) is a joint
microfinance and coffee-marketing cooperative, operating in Bukonzo
County along the northern slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains in Western
Uganda, near the Democratic Republic of the Congo (see Figure A1 in the
online supplemental appendix for a map of the region). Bukonzo County
comprises a population of 280,500 and is an exclusively agricultural area
with poor communication infrastructure and large distances to producer
markets. The area was further marginalized in the 1990s due to civil strife
and abductions by rebel groups. Most settlements lie between 1,300 and
2,300 above sea level, ideal for the growing of Arabica coffee. Annually,
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
Table 1 Average group characteristics
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Year group was formed 74a 2004c 2000 2010
Year group was formed (sample) 26b 2004c 2000 2010
No. of group members 66a 31.03 15.13 15.00 114.00
No. of group members (sample) 26b 35.39 18.06 22.00 108.00
Share of women members in group 66a 0.76 0.12 0.46 1.00
Share of women members in group (sample) 26b 0.79 0.10 0.50 1.00
Average savings per group member (in Ush)d 66a 96,753 74,390 1,790 302,273
Average share capital per member (in Ush)d 64a 135,213 83,262 19,063 344,642
Distance to cooperative (in walking min.) 26b 33.27 30.56 0.00 120.00
Frequency of meetings per month 26b 3.80 0.54 2.00 4.00
Notes: aBased on cooperative statistics from March 2012. bBased on July/Aug. 2012 survey of twenty-
six groups. cMedian. dThe US dollar amount is calculated at the July 2012 exchange rate of $1 =
2,450 Ush.
the area experiences two rainy seasons, resulting in two coffee-harvesting
seasons that occupy farmers almost all year round in the cycle of coffee
cultivation, namely planting, tending, harvesting, processing, and selling
the crop.
The cooperative was founded in 1999 and initially started off as a
microfinance cooperative that organized its members into self-help groups
in order to provide access to credit and thrift facilities and establish a
network of mutual support within a context of poverty. There are no official
selection criteria for membership in farmer groups related to gender, age,
or land ownership, except that existing group members need to accept
new members who then pay a membership fee and subscribe to at least
one cooperative share worth 10,000 Ush (US$4). Table 1 presents the
descriptive statistics of the sampled and total producer groups. Initially,
in 1999 the cooperative comprised eleven women-only groups. By 2012,
BJC had grown to serve 2,220 local small-scale farmers, distributed across
seventy-four groups. On average, each farmer group comprises thirty-
one members and ranges from fifteen to 114 members. On average,
76 percent of the members are women. The share of women members
is negatively correlated with group size, which suggests that they prefer
smaller groups with closer social ties. Group meeting locations are situated
33 minutes average walking distance from the nearest main road. On
average, group members saved US$39, while the average share capital
per member amounted to US$55. As a collateral substitute, loans (with a
monthly interest rate of 2 percent) are tied to member savings and require
the guarantee of at least three members within each producer group.
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Figure 2 Value chain and marketing activities of BJC
Figure 2 shows that over the years, the group model offered the
opportunity for BJC to integrate complementary services for its members.
Since 2005, an internal marketing association pools and markets
internationally members’ coffee. As a result, members can expect higher
and more stable prices for their coffee. In 2010, BJC bulked 300 tons of
organically grown coffee. To maximize the utility of washing stations and
increase the quantity of coffee BJC also buys coffee from nonmembers.
However, nonmembers are excluded from access to financial services and
agricultural training, or rebate distribution at the end of the sales season.
Before export, BJC provides the final stage in the green-coffee value chain
by hulling (removing the dried husk) members’ coffee.
DATA
The data for this analysis was collected using a structured survey of women
cooperative members and nonmembers which was carried out between
June and August 2012 in seven subcounties of Bukonzo County in Western
Uganda. All subcounties are major coffee-producing regions located on the
slopes of the Rwenzori Mountains within the same agroecological zone and
altitude.
First, women cooperative members were selected through stratified
random sampling. Using a list of all sixty-five producer groups of BJC that
formed between 1999 and 2010, they were grouped into four year clusters
according to their year of formation (1999–2001, 2002–4, 2005–7, and
2008–10) to capture time variation. From each cluster, six producer groups
were randomly selected. Additionally, two extra groups were sampled from
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
the year clusters 2002–4 and 2005–7 to account for the comparatively larger
number of newly formed groups in those periods. In total, twenty-six groups
were randomly selected. Next, within each producer group, sixteen women
members who had a husband at the time were randomly drawn using
a lottery game, resulting in a total of 421 group member observations.1
Moreover, within the treatment area of each sampled producer group,
eight married women were randomly drawn, totaling 210 noncooperative
observations. Interviews were conducted in private, without the husband
present, by trained enumerators speaking the local language of Lukonzo.
I control for enumerators’ gender in the following regression analysis to
account for systematic response differences.
Table 1 inspires confidence that the twenty-six randomly sampled
groups make a fairly representative match concerning average group
characteristics: size, gender composition, and length of existence. The
sample only contains BJC members that were active at the time of the
survey. Information on those members who exited their group in the past
was not possible to survey. “Surviving” members may have a higher average
social standing than members who dropped out.
METHODS AND VARIABLES
Multivariate regression analysis is used to investigate the determinants
of women smallholders’ participation in the cooperative, as well as their
participation intensity within the institution. The study follows a two-fold
empirical strategy.
The first objective is to identify what determines women’s cooperative
membership. For that purpose a probit model is estimated. The
sample is restricted to cooperative members and nonmembers from
treatment regions. Because present-day income, decision-making power,
asset endowments may be endogenously affected by participation, such
indicators have not been included. Only variables that can be measured
ex-ante cooperative membership are included in the model. Women’s
agency is proxied though age at first marriage, spousal age difference,
and women’s capacity to exercise choice over her marriage partner. We
also include a dummy for husband’s control over coffee sales before
membership as well as control for polygamous marriages by including the
number of co-wives. In addition, because 34 percent of non-BJC members
claimed to be members of local savings and credit cooperatives (SACCO),
another binary-dependent variable was constructed for robustness, which
includes both BJC and non-BJC SACCO membership to investigate the
determinants of women’s access to capital through cooperatives in the
region.
The second objective is to explore the factors that determine cooperative
members’ level of participation within the organization. After farmers have
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decided to join the cooperative, they choose their degree of participation
within the organization. Active participation in the cooperative’s operations
is critical to cooperatives’ performance, as it depends on members
sale of produce and share capital contributions. Women‘s intensity of
participation in the cooperative is measured twofold.
First, cooperatives depend on members selling their produce exclusively
through the cooperative to achieve economies of scale and fetch higher
market prices for members’ bulk produce. We use members’ coffee sales
through BJC versus side selling from those 387 women members (92
percent) who cultivated coffee and earned an income from it during the
last year. Among those coffee-selling cooperative members, 79 percent sold
their produce through the cooperative in the last year, while 21 percent side
sold to private traders.2 This finding indicates that BJC competes with local
buyers for members’ coffee. Cooperative members may opt to sell to private
buyers because of immediate cash requirements to pay school and hospital
fees. Spousal competition over coffee sales may also tempt members to
side sell, rather than to wait weeks of identification of a bulk buyer by the
cooperative. Conversely, local buyers usually pay promptly in cash (Marcel
Fafchamps and Ruth V. Hill 2005). The quantity and marketable share of
a member’s produce delivered to their cooperative has been commonly
applied as a measure of commitment to cooperatives (Mensah et al. 2012;
Fischer and Qaim 2014; Wollni and Fischer 2015). This study uses the more
extreme cases to construct a binary dependent variable of coffee-growing
members who sold their coffee to BJC versus those members who decided
to avoid participating in collective marketing.
Secondly, members’ share capital is used as a measure of participants’
long-term commitment to the cooperative. Mobilizing members to
voluntarily invest in share capital is critical for the growth of cooperatives,
representing the most important source of capital to enhance efficiency
and expand the value-chain frontier (Von Pischke and Rouse 2004). After
becoming a member at BJC, and thus having subscribed to the required
minimum of one capital share, every member obtains the full benefits from
membership irrespective of their equity invested. The size of loans of BJC
to its members is not conditioned by share ownership, and no limit to the
number of annual share purchases exists. Also, BJC permits withdrawal
of shares, once a new buyer has been identified. Motivations for share
capital investment comprise commercial interests, as cooperative annual
surplus earnings from microfinance services are distributed proportionally
to members’ financial patronage. In contrast, coffee rebates are distributed
according to members’ marketable share of coffee sales to the cooperative.
Furthermore, because each producer group is entitled to send onemember
per ten group shares to the annual general assembly, members’ can
increase their likelihood of being able to vote on behalf of their group
through share acquisitions. However, 101 out of the 421 sampled women
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
cooperative members did not disclose the number of capital shares owned
for reasons unknown.
Using the truncated sample of 320 non-censored observations could lead
to biased OLS estimators. Potential selection bias between the censored and
non-censored samples is investigated by testing for the equality of means
between members who disclosed share ownership versus those who did
not (see Table A1 in the online supplemental appendix on publisher’s
website). No statistically significant differences are found, except for length
of membership, indicating that veteran members were more likely to
disclose share ownership. Yet, the marginal effect is relatively minor and
additional robustness tests presented in Table A2 in the online appendix
inspire confidence that the estimators of the following probit and OLS
regressions are to be trusted.
To investigate what influences women’s degree of participation in the
cooperative a wide set of agency, household, and group characteristics are
used in the model. Women’s intrahousehold decision-making agency is
measured through an index of four areas of decision making concerning
household expenditures (health, education, food, and household). The
bargaining score is constructed to take into account women’s autonomous
decision making, joint decision making, and no decision making. One
concern is that the purchase of shares precedes the contemporaneous
index of decision-making autonomy, which is measured at the time of
the survey. However, while gender norms are not static they do not
change overnight. The process of challenging such norms typically has a
long time horizon (Agarwal 1997; Kabeer 1999; Pandolfelli, Meinzen-Dick,
and Dohrn 2008). Therefore, the contemporaneous measure of women’s
relative bargaining power is likely to capture women’s bargaining positions
ex-ante the moment of the survey.
Spousal income pooling measures the mutual sharing of financial
resources between spouses and is constructed as a binary variable of
each of the spouses sharing at least half of their income. Correlation
matrices in Tables A3 and A4 (in online supplemental appendix) reveal
that these three variables capturing household gender dynamics barely
correlate with each other. Further, we are also interested in the level of
sharing of productive resources between spouses, which is measured as
a binary variable of joint land ownership. Farm size of both wife and
husband is used as gendered wealth indicators over productive resources.
Furthermore, we include households’ annual income from coffee to
account for the quantity of coffee produced. In the conceptual framework
the hypothetical ambiguous role of husbands being comembers in wives’
groups was emphasized. To investigate matters, a binary variable for
husband’s comembership is utilized. Lastly, it is controlled for members
having received a loan from the cooperative over the past year, as
they hypothetically attach greater value to coffee marketing through the
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cooperative, showing reciprocity in their behavior. Also, various group-level
characteristics are included, such as group size, gender homogeneity, and
distance to the cooperative.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Table 2 presents the various ways sampled women members participated
within the cooperative in the year 2011/2012. Almost all members saved
money in individual saving accounts, three-quarters marketed their coffee
through the cooperative, two-fifth received credit, and about one in five
attended participatory gender or technical coffee trainings.
Furthermore, 70 percent of sampled BJC members stated that coffee
constitutes their primary source of income, followed by the sale of food
crops, barter trading, and farming activities. Access to financial means was
the most important motivation for members to join BJC (62 percent),
followed by coffee-market access (21 percent). Interestingly, 88 percent of
nonmembers reported that they would like to become a member of BJC
but that lack of money and time (42 percent), a limited understanding
and trust in the functioning of cooperatives (25 percent), as well as their
husbands’ disapproval (4 percent) has impeded them thus far.
There is evidence for competition and noncooperation between spouses
over coffee sales, as 24 percent of wives sold unprocessed coffee at a lower
price (to private buyers) to avoid their husband “stealing” the coffee. In
turn, 17 percent of husbands took coffee in the last year and sold it at
a lower price to get the money before their wife. Lack of cooperation
in home coffee production can reduce households’ quality and quantity
of coffee to be sold to the cooperative (Baluku, Mayoux, and Reemer
2009). This problem is exacerbated by the fact that 21 percent of coffee-
growing cooperative members decided not to sell any coffee through the
cooperative but preferred to sell to local buyers.3 Thus, a relevant question
is why individual marketing continues to represent such an important
strategy?
In all coffee-producing households, women are significantly involved
in coffee cultivation and processing tasks (see Table A5 in online
Table 2 Types of BJC member participation in 2011/12
Total %
Saving deposits 375 89.1
Coffee sales to cooperative 317 75.3
Microcredit 168 39.9
Particpatory gender training 82 19.5
Technical coffee training 70 16.6
Observations 421
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
supplemental appendix). Men are particularly involved in the initial
heavy-duty tasks of clearing the land, digging terraces, and planting coffee
trees. Harvesting of coffee is largely organized jointly. Processing, the more
time-intensive task, is largely done together, although a third is exclusively
done by the wife. Despite the fact that transport of coffee to the cooperative
is largely performed by the wife or jointly, 40 percent of husbands received
the payment. Overall, it appears that members are more likely to join forces
with their husband than nonmembers.
Descriptive statistics of individual and household characteristics used in
the following multivariate regression analysis for the samples of currently
partnered women cooperative members and nonmembers are presented
in Table 3.
RESULTS
What determines women’s cooperative membership?
Estimation results of women’s cooperative membership are presented
in Table 4. It shows that the size of land owned before membership,
has a positive and highly significant effect on women’s probability of
membership. One additional acre of land owned increases women’s
probability of becoming a member of BJC by about 30 percentage
points (column 1) compared to 20 percentage points for any other
cooperative members (column 2). The positive effect of smallholders’
resource endowment on participation in cooperatives aligns with previous
findings of Wollni and Zeller (2007), Bernard and Spielman (2009), and
Fischer and Qaim (2012). This is plausible because women with larger
farms may be more inclined to participate in collective marketing because
of the larger perceived gains from improved access to markets, related
inputs, and extension services. Another reason might be that women with
greater possession over arable land have more power to choose whether
to participate in cooperatives (Agarwal 1997). The importance of land
for women’s access to cooperatives also resonates with recent literature
that highlights the importance of women’s acquisition of formal land
titles of their customary tenure systems in order to ensure that their
future resource claims are not threatened by the rapid growth of demand
for African agricultural land (Cheryl R. Doss, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, and
Allan Bomuhangi 2014). Also, older women are more likely to join the
cooperative, potentially having been growing coffee for a longer time and
thus more likely to value the benefits that come with membership.
Against our expectations, women nonmembers are more likely to
be able to read and write than cooperative members (see Table 4,
column 1). Possibly, better-educated women depend less on cooperatives
for gaining access to financial and agricultural markets, but rely on
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Table 3 Summary statistics of variables used in regressions by respondent groups
Members Nonmembers
(n = 421) (n = 210)
Variable Description Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Dif.
Member coop† Member of BJC or any
other SACCO (1 = yes)
1.00 0.00 0.34 0.48 ***
Wife’s age Age of wife (years) 36.92 11.57 30.24 10.28 ***
Spousal age
difference
Age difference husband
and wife (years)
6.10 5.63 5.64 5.56
Wife’s literacy Wife able to write name
(1 = yes)
0.59 0.49 0.80 0.77 ***
Husband’s
literacy
Husband able to write
name (1 = yes)
0.86 0.34 0.92 0.32 **
Skill training Agriculture skill training >
2 months (1 = yes)
0.15 0.36 0.07 0.25 ***
Marriage age Age at first marriage (in
years)
18.25 3.23 18.24 2.89
Catholic Catholic faith (1 = yes) 0.52 0.50 0.55 0.49
Arranged
marriage
Husband not chosen by
wife (1 = yes)
0.17 0.38 0.16 0.37
Co-wives Number of co-wives in
polygamous marriages
0.43 0.65 0.33 0.60
Land prior BJC
wife (ln)
Ln land owned by wife
before BJC (in acres)
0.50 0.57 0.17 0.333 ***
Husband controls
coffee sales
Husband’s control over
coffee before BJC
Membership (1 = yes)
0.36 0.55 0.30 0.46
Mobility Born in Bukonzo county
(1 = yes)
0.86 0.34 0.90 0.29
Additional variables used in members’ intensity of participation regression
Collective salesa† Member sells coffee to BJC
last year (1 = yes)
0.75 0.02
Coop shares (ln)† Number of capital shares
purchased (ln)
1.64 0.06
Wife’s land (ln) Wife’s land ownership in
acres (ln)
0.19 0.41
Husband’s land
(ln)
Husband’s land ownership
in acres (ln)
0.79 0.54
Income from coffee
(ln)a
Annual coffee income in
Ush (ln)
13.16 0.94
Household size Number of individuals
eating from same pot
7.53 4.93
Coffee grower Cultivates coffee on own
land (1 = yes)
0.97 0.16
(Continued).
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WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE ACTION
Table 3 Continued
Members Nonmembers
(n= 421) (n= 210)
Variable Description Mean S.E. Mean S.E. Dif.
Coffee-processing wifea Member responsible for
processing coffee (index)
0.61 0.25
Wet processa Member wet processes coffee
(1 = yes)
0.36 0.48
Control: wife’s coffee
salesa
Member in control of
delivery of coffee to
market and receives
payment (1 = yes)
0.57 0.37
Prior coop member Member of other cooperative
before BJC (1 = yes)
0.22 0.43
Motivation BJC: coffee
sales
Motivation for membership:
coffee sales (1 = yes)
0.20 0.40
Credit BJC wife Member received BJC loan
last year (1 = yes)
0.46 0.50
Decision-making wife Index variable of four
household women’s
decision making (1), joint
(0.5), or husband’s (0)
decision making
0.18 0.28
Spousal income pooling Spouses share at least half of
his/her incomes (1 = yes)
0.26 0.43
Joint land ownership Spouses have joint land
agreement (1 = yes)
0.29 0.45
Husband comember Husband is co-member at
BJC (1 = yes)
0.35 0.47
Length BJC member (ln) Number of years as BJC
member
Gender enumerator Enumerator is a man
(1 = yes)
0.62 0.48
Observations 421 210
Notes: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance between the mean values of non-cooperative
members and cooperative members at the 10, 5, and, 1 percent levels respectively. †Dependent
variables: aCoffee growers with reproducible coffee plants (for example, with any income from coffee
in the last year; n = 387).
formal labor opportunities, which improve their chances of receiving bank
loans. However, women highly committed to advance their agricultural-
production skills through training are more likely to be aware of and
attracted to perceived gains of cooperative membership. This holds for
both specifications in column 1 and 2 of Table 4, and controlling for
educational difference with the husband.
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Table 4 Determinants of women’s membership in cooperative (probit model)
(1) (2)
BJC participation Any coop participation
Coef. S.E. M.E. Coef. S.E. M.E.
Wife’s age 0.025*** 0.006 0.009*** 0.015** 0.006 0.004**
Wife literacy − 0.226** 0.095 − 0.072** − 0.110 0.091 − 0.030
Husband’s literacy − 0.002 0.186 − 0.000 − 0.107 0.199 − 0.029
Agri. skill training 0.590*** 0.184 0.175*** 0.637*** 0.215 0.135***
Land prior BJC: wife
(ln)
0.856*** 0.127 0.295*** 0.766*** 0.131 0.205***
Arranged marriage − 0.108 0.155 − 0.038 − 0.090 0.162 − 0.024
Marriage age − 0.008 0.018 − 0.003 0.003 0.019 0.001
Spousal age difference 0.005 0.011 0.002 0.004 0.012 0.001
Co-wives − 0.054 0.095 − 0.019 − 0.061 0.103 − 0.016
Husband controls
coffee sale
0.135 0.105 0.046 0.072 0.109 0.019
Catholic − 0.072 0.111 − 0.025 0.073 0.117 0.019
Mobility − 0.273 0.180 − 0.088 − 0.181 0.187 − 0.046
Constant − 0.206 0.450 0.206 0.472
Observations 631 631
Pseudo R² 0.149 0.101
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5,
and, 1 percent levels respectively. M.E. denotes marginal effects.
Surprisingly, women members and nonmembers are not statistically
different regarding the three measures of women’s agency, indicating
that initial conditions under which their marriages took place seem
to matter less for subsequent participation in collective action while
power over productive resources play an important role. Further, women
in polygamous households and where the husband’s controlled coffee
sales before membership are not statistically different for members and
nonmembers.
What determines women’s participation within the cooperative
Participation in collective coffee marketing
Table 5 presents the regression results, reporting probit coefficients and
marginal effects on women members’ coffee sales to their cooperative.
The empirical results highlight the importance of intrahousehold dynamics
for women’s commitment to collective marketing. When spouses pool
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Table 5 Determinants of women’s collective coffee marketing in cooperative
(probit model)
Dependent variable:
coffee sales through BJC Coef. S.E. M.E.
Wife’s age − 0.008 0.009 − 0.002
Wife’s literacy 0.037 0.179 0.009
Husband’s literacy 0.067 0.228 0.017
Co-wives 0.079 0.118 0.019
Household size − 0.013 0.013 − 0.003
Wife’s land (ln) − 0.050 0.215 − 0.012
Husband’s land (ln) − 0.240 0.183 − 0.058
Decision-making wife 0.137 0.308 0.033
Spousal income pooling 0.702*** 0.208 0.143***
Joint land ownership 0.442** 0.204 0.097**
Credit BJC wife − 0.130 0.168 − 0.032
Motivation BJC: coffee sales 0.649** 0.256 0.128**
Husband co-member 0.508*** 0.183 0.113***
Length BJC member (ln) 0.243* 0.146 0.059*
Income coffee (ln) 0.160* 0.095 0.039*
Coffee processing wife 0.500 0.327 0.122
Wet processing coffee 0.377** 0.183 0.086**
Control: wife’s coffee sales 0.130 0.226 0.031
Group size 0.010 0.007 0.002
Group distance 0.002 0.003 0.001
Group share female 3.105*** 1.124 0.749***
Gender survey enumerator 0.735*** 0.188 0.193***
Constant − 5.546*** 1.618
Observations 387
Pseudo R² 0.200
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5,
and, 1 percent levels respectively. M.E. denotes marginal effects. Due to multicollinearity between
group characteristics and group dummies the regression excludes group fixed effects. Statistical
significance levels of the coefficients do not change when substituting group characteristics with
group fixed effects.
their incomes, women are more likely to sell the family’s coffee to the
cooperative, suggesting that spouses’ mutual sharing of resources increases
the likelihood of trading with their cooperative. In a similar vein, joint land
ownership positively predicts the likelhood of selling to the cooperative.
This mechanism is reinforced by the fact that husband’s increased land
ownership adversely affected his wife’s ability to sell household coffee
to the cooperative, indicating that greater relative male ownership over
productive resources (coffee plants) is likely to increase their control
over crop marketing and side selling. This is in line with Wollni and
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Fischer (2015) who found that members with larger farms were increasingly
attracted to marketing a share of their coffee through private buyers.
Husband’s comembership in his wife’s cooperative significantly increases
the probability of collective marketing. This is plausible, as spousal
comembership may suggest that spouses share the idea of collective coffee
marketing. Therefore, encouraging spousal comembership and joint land
ownership may be promising strategies for cooperatives to strengthen
collective marketing. This resonates with the claims of earlier studies
finding that the management of natural resources is more effective when
both sexes are actively involved in community groups (Penrose-Buckley
2007; Parvin Sultana and Paul Thompson 2008; ElizabethWere, Jessica Roy,
and Brent Swallow 2008).
Length of membership positively affects the likelihood of selling to the
cooperative at the 10 percent significance level. Each additional year of
membership increases the probability of members’ selling through the
cooperative by 6 percentage points. Also, higher incomes from coffee in
the last year positively predict trading with BJC. In other words, larger farms
have an increased likelihood of trading with BJC. As expected, women
for whom coffee marketing was the main determinant in their choice of
joining the cooperative were also more committed to collective marketing.
Interestingly, women’s greater relative labor input in coffee production did
not affect trading with their cooperative.
Group size and the groups’ distance to markets, did not influence trading
with the cooperative. However, female group homogeneity positively
affected members’ decision to sell their coffee to the cooperative,
indicating that a greater share of women within producer groups can be
particularly effective for ensuring (other) women members’ loyalty to the
organization. Moreover, wet-processing coffee has a positive effect, which
reflects women’s larger ability and incentive to invest in upgrading their
coffee production through inputs and equipment. Because the cooperative
supports the acquisition of mini washing stations and drying racks through
credit and extension services, this result may also indicate that reprocity
motives play a role here. Surprisingly, women who received credit from BJC
in the last year were not more committed to sell their coffee beans to BJC
than those who remained “unbanked.”
Committing to share capital
Estimation results of the OLS regression of women members’ share
capital acquisitions are reported in Table 6. Column 1 presents the
specification including personal characteristics. Columns 2 and 3 extend
the model by including group characteristics and coffee production
controls.
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Table 6 Determinants of women’s share capital accumulation (OLS)
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
coop shares (ln) Coef. S.E.a Coef. S.E.a Coef. S.E.
Wife’s age 0.001 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.017 0.007
Wife’s literacy 0.423*** 0.135 0.357*** 0.143 0.307** 0.155
Husband’s literacy 0.129 0.160 0.088 0.168 0.183 0.186
Co-wives − 0.035 0.081 − 0.063 0.086 − 0.107 0.094
Household size − 0.004 0.006 − 0.006 0.007 − 0.006 0.007
Wife’s land (ln) 0.150 0.132 0.108 0.134 0.084 0.155
Husband’s land (ln) − 0.045 0.117 − 0.112 0.121 − 0.072 0.139
Decision-making wife 0.699*** 0.191 0.687*** 0.198 0.935*** 0.227
Spousal income pooling 0.355*** 0.140 0.335** 0.148 0.285* 0.163
Joint land ownership − 0.062 0.132 − 0.172 0.135 − 0.099 0.154
Length BJC member (ln) 0.847*** 0.090 0.770*** 0.096
Prior coop member − 0.293** 0.140 − 0.251 0.155 − 0.183 0.159
Motivation BJC: coffee sales − 0.047 0.152 − 0.097 0.157
Husband comember 0.028 0.120 0.004 0.130
Income coffee (ln) 0.013 0.029 0.043 0.036
Processing coffee wife 0.220 0.244 0.209 0.278
Wet processing coffee 0.334** 0.133 0.504*** 0.141
Control coffee sales wife 0.058 0.157 0.128 0.180
Group size 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005
Group distance 0.000 0.002 − 0.000 0.002
Group share women 0.637 0.854 0.634 0.925
Gender survey enumerator − 0.085 0.128 − 0.071 0.139 − 0.167 0.151
Constant − 0.563 0.284 − 1.324 0.971 − 1.257 1.080
Observations 320 306 306
R² 0.318 0.325 0.191
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10,
5, and, 1 percent levels respectively. S.E. denotes robust standard errors. Due to multicollinearity
between group characteristics and group dummies the regression excludes group fixed effects.
Statistical significance levels of the coefficients do not change when substituting group characteristics
with group fixed effects.
Unlike recent studies that point to group characteristics, such as
membership size, homogeneity, and market distance, group characteristics
do not predict women’s capital commitment within BJC. However, the
results rather seem to point to intrahousehold power dynamics again.
Women from households in which spouses pool at least half of their
incomes tend to own a greater financial stake of the cooperative,
which suggests that increased household cooperation is likely to enhance
women’s financial patronage within cooperatives. This argument is
strengthened by the finding that wives’ increased decision-making power
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concerning household expenditures has a positive and highly significant
influence on their commitment to cooperatives. This finding persists after
I control for various group characteristics (column 2) and exclude length
of membership (column 3).
Both results suggest that women’s ability to intensify their participation
within cooperatives would benefit from more gender-equal household
relations. Thus, one way for cooperatives to strengthen women members’
capacity and willingness to increase commitment, and contribute to the
expansion of the cooperative’s capital base, may lie in raising women’s
social position within the household. Because cooperatives are community-
based and build on members’ trust they present ideal entry points for
additional activities that aim at challenging and changing intrahousehold
gender inequalities, which, in turn, can increase women’s participation in
collective action (Linda Mayoux 1995a, 1995b).
Literate women were more inclined to purchase cooperative shares
possibly because relatively better educated women have a stronger relative
intrahousehold-bargaining position with regard to investment decisions,
are more likely to have acquired numeracy skills, and possess a greater
long-term investment horizon than less-educated women. Moreover, the
ability of women farmers to contribute capital is likely to depend on their
individual and family wealth. Members with larger farms may have had
sufficient income to purchase shares and arguably be less risk averse than
smaller farmers who might be more reluctant toward costly investments.
Hence, it is somewhat surprising that the size of wives’ and husbands’
land holdings, as well as income from coffee, did not influence share
capital contributions. I find that members who were committed to invest
in new production techniques and to improve their coffee quality were
not only more likely to sell their coffee through the cooperative, but
also increasingly contributed capital. Hence, cooperatives’ technical and
financial support (through loans and extension services), encouraging
members to switch to more efficient and viable processing methods, appear
to be instrumental for cooperatives to retain members.
As one would expect, duration of membership is highly significant
and positively affects members’ share-capital investment. Over time
members seem to extend their share capital beyond their required capital
subscription, reflecting trust in the future functioning of the organization.
Column 3 shows that the significant variables from the first specification
remain robust when excluding length of membership – the main driver of
differences between members that disclosed their shares and those who
did not (see earlier discussion on methods and variables). Contrary to
the positive effect of husband’s comembership on collective marketing,
husband’s comembership has no statistically significant effect on women’s
capital commitment, suggesting that spouses do not compete for capital
shares when they are both members.
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CONCLUSION
Using survey data of women cooperative smallholder coffee farmers as
well as women noncooperative smallholder farmers from Western Uganda,
this contribution offers a first pass at analyzing and measuring the
determinants of women’s participation in cooperative producer groups and
their intensity of participation within this collective-action institution.
First, the study explored the determinants for women’s cooperative
membership. The results highlight the importance of women’s control
over agricultural land for participating in collective action. The applied
measures of women’s agency prior to cooperative membership are not
statistically different between women members and nonmembers. This
suggests that initial marital gender imbalances can be reversed over time
and do not necessarily constrain women’s participation in cooperatives.
Moreover, cooperative members were more likely to have attended
agricultural-skill training prior to membership, indicating that voluntary
agriculture value-chain training within the community may be one strategy
for cooperatives to attract new members.
Second, women members’ intensity of participation in collective action
was modeled through their participation in collective coffee marketing and
women’s share-capital contributions. Women with larger investments into
the quality of their coffee, through wet-processing methods, were more
likely to commit to collective marketing and share capital. Because the
cooperative financed members’ wet-processing equipment and facilitated
post-harvest training, it suggests that members reward these cooperative
investments. Unlike recent studies that point to group characteristics,
this contribution demonstrates the embeddedness of collective action in
gender relations and the positive value of women’s active participation for
agricultural marketing cooperatives. The findings highlight the importance
of intrahousehold power relations for women’s ability to actively participate
in cooperative producer groups. In each of the two regression models,
estimating women’s degree of participation in collective action, two out of
three gender-equity measures are statistically significant. On the one hand,
husbands’ greater relative land ownership adversely affects wives’ collective
marketing, implying that men’s relative control over productive resources
is likely to decrease women’s collective-marketing prospects. On the other
hand, husbands’ comembership in their wife’s cooperative increases the
probability of women’s collective marketing. This suggests if cooperatives
promote greater involvement of both partners in producer groups, they
can boost the efficiency of cash-crop marketing. However, in order to
achieve this in the short and medium run women-only groups might be
necessary first steps, whereas underlying social norms that prevent women’s
participation on an equal basis are likely to be more effectively addressed
in the long run in mixed groups. Another means of incorporating women
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more effectively in cooperatives may include the promotion and assistance
of registration of formal joint land titles accompanied by participatory
gender trainings and learning approaches, including both partners (and
potentially nonmembers), that emphasize the mutual advantages of spousal
cooperation along the coffee value chain and more equal intrahousehold
power relationships. For cooperatives this has the potential to enhance
both women’s (degree of) participation in collective action and the
effectiveness of the cooperative itself.
Overall, the findings imply that gender inequalities on the household
level matter considerably for women’s participation in collective action.
Hence, cooperatives that fail to address gender, or target women without a
clear understanding of power relations (along the agricultural value chain),
risk not to set the right conditions for women’s active participation and thus
fail to fully exploit the enormous potential of making the cooperative a
more effective and inclusive organization. Because cooperatives are closely
entrenched in their local community, they represent unique entry points
for strategic programs to strengthen women’s voice and agency in the
market and at home.
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NOTES
1 Note that five additional respondents were included to account for the extraordinary
size of one of the producer groups consisting of 108 members.
2 Members do not face expulsion or financial penalty for coffee sold illicitly.
3 The figure includes only smallholders who earned an income from coffee in the last
year.
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